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Abstract. The presentation of this research paper in the 10th. annual Conference of the Western 
Hemispheric Development in the University of Texas A&M in Laredo Texas, (April 23-25, 2005) 
brought a great opportunity to reflect the efforts of a region in the north of Mexico for the world’s 
peace and security inside the International trade with the gowth factors important for any and all 
nations. In this investigation the combined efforts of USA and Mexico are shown to protect the 
International Trade against the acts of terrorism and smuggling of illegal drugs which constantly try 
to infiltrate their illicit activities, delivering a great damage to companies that carry out activities of 
international trade. Relevant conclusions are presented at the end of the paper. 
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Resumen. La oportunidad  de presentar esta ponencia dentro de la 10 anual Conferencia del 
Wester Hemispherif Develomptment, en la Universidad de Texas A&M en Laredo Texas, (Abril 23-
25, 2005) fue una gran oportunidad para mostrar los esfuerzos de una región del norte de México 
por la paz y seguridad dentro del Comercio Internacional, que es en si uno de los factores de 
desarrollo mas importante para cualquier nación. En esta investigación se muestran los esfuerzos 
conjuntos d EEUU y México para proteger el Comercio Internacional de los actos de terrorismo y 
contrabando de drogas ilegales, que desgraciadamente utilizan este medio, para infiltrar sus 
actividades ilícitas, y por ende, es una gran perjuicio para compañías que honestamente realizan 
actividades de comercio internacional. Así mismo, se presentan las conclusiones sobre estas 
discusiones al final de artículo. 
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Introduction 
 
Governments are struggling to co-ordinate export / import controls for 
several reasons. First, the members of the foreign regimes are finding it more and 
more difficult to agree on which countries should be targeted for stringent controls. 
The export / imports control regimes originated with groups of like-minded supplier 
states, notably the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan that 
agreed on the nature of the threat and appropriate responses (Garcia Sordo, 
2003) 
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of states participating in the 
regimes has grown, but at the cost of diluting the original membership criteria. 
This expansion was driven primarily by the euphoric belief in the nonproliferation 
community that the end of the Cold War had inaugurated an era in which former 
Warsaw Pact states would make common cause with the West to squelch WMD 
proliferation. Another factor was the consolidation of the European Union (EU) 
(Daniels, 2003) into a common economic market with few barriers to the 
movement of goods and services. The extension of the export control regimes to 
include the EU thus became almost automatic. The MTCR, for example, has 
grown in membership from seven members (the Group of Seven) in 1987 to 33 in 
2002. That means that the regimes now include non suppliers as well as states 
that differ significantly in their definition of threats and their understanding of the 
letter and spirit of the requirements imposed by the regimes. 
 
Methodology 
 
In addition to dealing with the internal strains caused by their growing 
membership, the regimes must also cope with external pressures from increasing 
globalization and the rapid advancement of technology. In the high-technology 
sector, for example, industry standards and practices change rapidly, and these 
innovations spread quickly around the world. At the same time, the growth of 
global trade and financial markets has encouraged consolidation and integration 
across national borders through mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
strategic partnerships. In addition, the leveling effect of the skill revolution and 
technology diffusion has induced industry to reorganize its functions in global 
networks rather than nationally based hierarchies. Intra-firm and intra-industry 
intelligence gathering and information-sharing have become the prime requisites 
for rapid innovation. 
At the same time, global defense and high-technology firms are engaged 
in an increasingly competitive struggle for markets. Export controls that place 
uneven or significant hurdles in the  
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Way of efficient sharing of information, ideas, and personnel across 
national boundaries is viewed by many global companies as a threat to their ability 
to innovate and to capture new markets. 
The multilateral control regimes include provisions for revision and 
updating of the necessary lists and rules. In theory, then, they should be able to 
adapt swiftly to changes in technology and industry. In practice, they operate in a 
bureaucratic environment that allows only glacial change—meaning that reform 
measures inevitably fall behind technological innovation (Daniels, 2003). 
Government regulations on the export of goods, technologies, and skilled 
personnel, whether national or multilateral, have lagged far behind business. Even 
at the national level, officials have to struggle to build a consensus around new 
regulatory needs and, in some cases, even struggle to comprehend how emerging 
technologies are related to security requirements. As a result, timely international 
coordination is even more problematic. 
Controlling exports of emerging dual-use technologies today requires 
particular foresight and the ability to juggle competing demands. Officials in 
supplier states have to keep pace not only with technologies that pose a threat 
today but also with technological innovations that might be militarily relevant 
tomorrow. At the same time, they have to stay abreast of whether foreign 
competitors are moving forward with similar sales, for fear that by clamping down 
too hard they could threaten the competitiveness of domestic firms—harming their 
own constituents. 
 
Proposed solutions 
 
How can the multilateral export control regimes be reformed to address 
the growing list of challenges before them? Knowledgeable observers have 
proposed a variety of options for strengthening them. We can broadly categorize 
these into policy- and process-level solutions. Policy-level solutions recommend a 
frank re-examination of the purpose of the regimes, the role of the United States in 
them, the demands issued by the new members, and their policies toward 
nonmembers. Process-level solutions recommend ways to improve the export 
control regimes by making them more robust, by improving information sharing, 
and by socializing new members into the norms of nonproliferation. Strengthening 
the regimes will require solutions at both the policy and process levels. 
As a first step, export control regime member states should institute a 
permanent secretariat in Vienna for the four existing regimes and arrange for them 
to hold their plenary meetings in that city. A meeting of all countries that are party 
to one or more of the export control regimes would be held prior to the individual 
plenaries. This grand plenary meeting might be called ―The Multilateral Export 
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Control Coordination Forum.‖ This forum would facilitate discussions of how best 
to address many of the cross-cutting export control issues currently facing the 
regimes while serving as a platform for negotiating a newly restructured export 
control regime that would encompass the controls embodied in the existing four 
regimes. Bringing together the work of the existing regimes would help minimize 
their inefficiencies while putting their limited political and technical resources to 
best use. 
Holding the plenary meetings of existing export control regimes jointly 
would yield manifold benefits. First, it would promote inter-regime dialogue on 
cross-cutting export control issues such as transshipment, controls on transfers of 
intangible technologies, information sharing on end-users of concern, best 
practices, and harmonized export documentation. Second, it would help avoid 
duplication of effort, because the strategies to deal with complex control issues 
and problematic end-users vis-à-vis different types of technologies are similar, if 
not the same. 
Third, it would save money. Too much of what occurs at regime meetings 
is ―diplomatic tourism.‖ For example, in 2003 the regime plenaries will be held in 
Seoul (NSG), Buenos Aires (MTCR), and Vienna (Wassenaar Arrangement). The 
presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other security 
and economic institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission in 
Vienna would also facilitate cost savings because regime members could post 
their technical experts on nuclear and other security issues in the city for 
managing related nonproliferation work. 
Fourth, co-locating the activities of all the regimes would allow them to 
build some institutional memory and semi-permanent expertise—counteracting 
the high rate of personnel turnover in national export control agencies and helping 
new entrants negotiate the sharp learning curve. A single location would also 
streamline the current, scattershot efforts of the regimes’ staffs to keep records of 
what transpired at various meetings. 
Finally, if multilateral export control efforts were centralized, higher-level 
policymakers would be more likely to attend the plenary sessions and see the 
importance of coordinating international controls on all dangerous items. Their 
participation, in turn, could mobilize the resources and the political capital needed 
to pursue a more significant restructuring of the existing four export control 
regimes. 
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Discussions 
 
Officials commonly offer several different objections to the notion of 
fundamentally revamping the export control regimes. Some experts and officials 
argue that even a sweeping process of centralizing and restructuring would not 
yield control regimes that are substantially more effective than the current ones. 
Others claim that any attempt to restructure or merge the regimes would risk 
moving export control efforts toward the least common denominator, thereby 
weakening multilateral efforts. Some point to problems that could arise from the 
fact the four regimes has differing memberships. From this, they conclude that 
establishing one control regime would be nearly impossible. Finally, some argue 
that renegotiating the regimes would be too politically difficult, and thus muddling 
through under the status quo is preferable (Czinkota, 2004). 
These concerns are worth considering. Yet, on closer examination, none 
of them provides grounds for failing to move quickly to strengthen multilateral 
proliferation controls given the growing challenges posed by global trade and the 
spread of dangerous weapons technology. First, crafting an overarching 
multilateral control regime would result not in a weaker regime, but in a stronger 
one. The point of restructuring a new regime is to raise the bar, not lower it. If the 
potential members of a new regime failed to negotiate a significantly improved 
arrangement, they would simply stick with the status quo and continue to make 
incremental improvements. 
Second, the reality is that the existing hodgepodge of regimes already 
represents the least common denominator. Almost any change would be an 
improvement. At present, all decisions are taken on the basis of consensus, 
allowing even one member to stall efforts at reform. By contrast, our idea is to 
begin by informally coordinating multilateral export controls across regimes and to 
use this collaborative work as a springboard to a new, overarching institution. The 
member governments would not agree to abandon the existing export control 
regimes until they were convinced that the new regime would be a meaningful 
improvement over the old. The existence of a new regime would also not obviate 
the possibility of, or need for, micro-regimes that might allow two or three 
countries to coordinate additional controls on selected technologies. 
The fact that the existing regimes have different memberships is also not 
an insurmountable obstacle to reform. The most politically significant membership 
issue is Russia’s absence from the Australia Group. Some officials in the United 
States and Europe are quick to note that the Australia Group is the most effective 
of the control regimes precisely because Russia is not a member. However, a 
restructured regime could deal with problem countries such as Russia, as well as 
concerns that members will not uphold the decisions laid down by the regime, in 
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at least three ways. First, under the aegis of a single regime, sub-arrangements 
might be devised that excluded Russia and thus side stepped the difficulties 
entailed in dealings with Moscow. Second, if consensus rules were replaced with 
more democratic voting rules, Russian attempts to stall reform would be thwarted. 
Third, if incorporated into the new regime, as we have proposed, a dispute-
resolution mechanism would allow other members collectively to censure, or even 
expel, problem countries. 
 
Results 
 
At the beginning of this year (actually the first year of the current 
administration of our state government), a planning process has been initiated, 
and it is oriented to improve the infrastructure of international trade, also aimed to 
include the state citizen in the process of decision-making. 
According to the context of the State Master Development Plan, the 
aspects of the economy and international trade play an important role for the 
importance of the state of Nuevo León in these areas.  
The state of Nuevo León has an international port of entry in the 
municipality of Colombia, which has a customs facility and ―Centro de Facilidades 
del Comercio Internacional‖ (International Trade Facilitation Center) administered 
by FIDENOR (Fidecomiso para el Desarrollo del Norte ―Northern Development 
Trust‖ in English). 
They represent a genuine facilitation center for world trade, capable of 
responding clearly as a solution to the needs generated by the large volume of 
foreign trade which passes through the northeastern part of the country. 
Mexico’s great opening to trade has made our country one of the nations 
involved in the greatest number of free trade agreements, in addition to the fact 
that it neighbors with the most economically powerful nation to the north. 
The U.S. border with Nuevo León is a little over three kilometers wide, 
which allows us to predict notable increases in trade that will potentially culminate 
in the imminence of a free trade agreement of the Americas, which eventually will 
be decided upon consensus. 
From that point specifically in the State Development Plan, strategic 
investment in the highway, railroad and service infrastructure is contemplated as a 
priority for efficient customs operation, which will generate development, and, of 
course, job creation.   
It is necessary to take into consideration, however, that new and 
unforeseen circumstances such as the following are present in the world trade 
environment: 
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a. The fight against terrorism has become the primary agenda of many 
countries in the western world, and without a doubt, the central axis of U.S. 
foreign policy. 
b. The job of verifying containers of merchandise in U.S. customs to 
decrease the entry of drug smuggling. 
c. The concepts of free trade, just-in-time, and deficiencies in international 
trade continue in vogue.  However, the elements of security in the transportation 
of merchandise have surpassed them in importance. 
 
The safe international border corridor program 
 
This has prompted the Nuevo León State Government to formulate the 
concept of the safe international border corridor program within this international 
context.  
This is basically an operative concept comprised of five components: 
I.  The first one consists of new installations to strengthen the 
International Trade Facilitation Center. 
II. The second ingredient consists of a railroad line which will connect the 
Colombia international port of entry, with the existing railroad line, and of course, 
the construction of the international railroad bridge crossing into the United States. 
III. The third component consists of an alternative highway between 
Monterrey and Colombia. 
IV. A fourth element of this corridor constitutes the possibility of 
transporting natural gas, LP gas and other forms of energy and 
telecommunications by taking advantage of rights of way already obtained by the 
State. 
V. The fifth element is basically the proposal that the safe international 
border corridor become a fiscal route connecting Nuevo Leon’s only two, but more 
than sufficient, customs houses: one in Colombia border crossing, and the other, 
at the interior facility at Monterrey Metro Area. 
 
Response to impact of security measures imposed by the U.S. on foreign 
trade 
 
Given the need to comply with the security measures imposed by the U.S., 
FIDENOR’s new services are oriented to offer grounds for safe exportation for 
Mexican companies in response to the actions from the United States. 
U.S. Customs has established a public-private cooperation initiative called 
CITIPAC, which is nothing more than an alliance between Customs and the 
private sector in order to confront terrorism.   
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The intention is to reduce the risk of international trade’s supply chains 
being affected or contaminated by illicit drugs,  arms, chemical materials and/or 
biological materials destined for terrorist use. 
In effect, not only to comply with the new customs requirements of our 
trade partners, but also to satisfy international security needs, Mexican firms, and 
especially those in Nuevo León, have adhered to this program in order to support 
the flow of Mexican exports into the U.S. and become integrated into the border 
security plans. 
Through FIDENOR, the state of Nuevo León offers what is called ―patios 
de exportación segura‖ (safe exportation grounds) through the installations at the  
Colombia Customs Checkpoint, where maximum security standards are in force in 
order to prevent the contamination of cargo by drugs, while at the same time 
serving also to coordinate supply chains. 
Within the plans for the Colombia Customs Checkpoint is the goal of 
being prepared to offer the services of a laboratory for the analysis of meat and 
other agricultural food products, which will also comply the sanitary regulations 
according to Mexican law, within a year.   
The state of Nuevo León is being aided by cooperation by Webb County 
authorities, who will be guided by U.S. advances with respect to this project, which 
has been the object of anticipated desire, for the improvement of communication 
and economic integration between the states of Nuevo León and Texas.   
The alternate highway is a necessity, as has been expressed over a 
period of many years by Nuevo León-based transportation workers, who pass 
through the area encompassed by the counties of Lampazos, Anáhuac and 
Sabinas via highway before arriving at Colombia.  Its importance is indisputable 
because this span of highway is the central axis with respect to the idea of the 
Safe International Border Corridor. 
The final topic to be addressed is the line of services, which is nothing 
other than the utilization of the rights of way which the State of Nuevo León 
already possesses within this Safe International Border. 
 One of the most important points of operation relates to optimal customs 
coordination; Nuevo León has a benefit which it shares only with the states of 
Coahuila and Chihuahua along the entire United States border. 
The state has 2 customs checkpoints for international trade.  One of them 
is the most modern and efficient checkpoint, which is in Colombia.  In addition, it 
has the interior customs checkpoint precisely in its industrial center at the Metro 
Area, providing excellence, as well as the most important services in the country. 
As a statistic, there are over 1,300 enterprises involved in foreign trade in 
Nuevo León, which have the opportunity to have their offices and cargo spaces 
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where they consider as most convenient, whether in Monterrey or on the border at 
Colombia. 
An interesting plan is that the customs authorities maintain the guarantees 
necessaries with respect to import/export tax credits through the fiscal route 
between Monterrey, as a customs office, and Colombia, as its counterpart as an 
entry and exit customs checkpoint.  This is the objective intended for a fiscal route 
between customs facilities with respect to international trade. 
 
Final remarks 
 
Free trade of goods and services contributes to higher economic growth 
in every country and around the world, leading to greater prosperity and economic 
opportunity.   
More than ever before, protecting every country national security depends 
on dynamic and innovative trade legislation and it s controls.  An effective export/ 
import control policy would recognize the reality that the national security is 
improved by enabling industries to thrive. U.S. national security and should be 
based on maintaining technological edge through innovation, not on a doomed 
effort to hoard as much technology as possible.  
One final topics to remember is that export / import controls can severely 
disrupt the business models that sustain competitive advantage.  For a large 
number of companies advantage is based, to a large extent, on speed-to-market 
and mass-marketing through electronic commerce and the World Wide Web. But 
the administrative costs of trying to determine what products may go to what end 
user for what purpose can easily wreak havoc with these models. The system in 
place encourages regulatory complexity. It emphasises bureaucratic processes 
and paperwork over co-ordination with allies countries  to prevent the bad end-
users from acquiring truly sensitive technologies. An effective export / import 
control policy would be based on multilateral cooperation and facilitating effective 
corporate compliance.  
So, the objective of this presentation on the topic of international peace 
and security is to present in a representative manner the collaboration necessary 
among Border States in order to fight against drug traffic and terrorism, while at 
the same time providing a structure for the flow of international trade.   
There is no doubt that universities provide a good platform for these 
interesting topics, as they permit that students and participants be given an idea 
as to what it means to be in the midst of international trade, whether as a 
government, or as an enterprise, and to be within the parameters required for 
international peace and security in our days. 
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